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Lessons From Lebanon:  
 Rubble Removal and  
  Explosive Ordnance Disposal
The insight and knowledge gained from rubble removal and explosive ordnance disposal in the 
Nahr el-Bared Camp, which was destroyed during heavy fighting in Lebanon in 2007, could greatly 
benefit future reconstruction efforts in war-damaged urban areas.
by Erik K. Lauritzen [ Lauritzen Advising ]
Clearing damaged buildings in densely populated urban areas is a high-priority in the reconstruc-tion of war-torn countries. After long periods of 
intense fighting, the need for unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
disposal, combined with rubble removal, increases the chal-
lenge of rebuilding.
Clearance of war-damaged buildings, recycling of building 
materials and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) were essen-
tial phases of past urban reconstruction projects. Prominent 
examples included Beirut after the 15-year civil war (1975–
1990), Sarajevo and Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 
Bosnian War (1992–1995), and Kosovo after NATO interven-
tion in 1999. In these locations, EOD units, specialized private 
groups or nongovernmental organizations (NGO) responded 
when rubble-removal contractors found UXO. Rubble remov-
al ceased during the EOD projects but proceeded following 
EOD completion. 
EOD organizations and rubble removal contractors co-
operate through two different frameworks, depending on the 
level of contamination in an area. When the amount of UXO 
Part of the war-damaged Nahr el-Bared Camp in northern Lebanon, prior to the start of the rubble-removal project 
(August 2008).
All photos courtesy of the author.
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found in the rubble is small or relatively low risk, on-
call EOD support from teams or experts is the most ef-
ficient tactic. However, sometimes locations have high 
concentrations of bombs, mines, UXO or other sensi-
tive explosive items. In this case EOD requires close 
support of experts or teams permanently on site. The 
reconstruction project in Nahr el-Bared Camp (NBC) 
was an example of this type of cooperation. 
The NBC demonstrated how clearance can bene-
fit from integrated rubble removal and EOD manage-
ment in a post-conflict urban area. This camp offers 
insight for other post-conflict urban settings, in-
cluding Syrian towns and cities currently experienc-
ing heavy fighting near the Lebanese border such as 
Homs, An Nabk, Deir Attiyeh and Al-Qusayr.1,2 
Nahr el-Bared Clearance
In 2007, NBC was the center of severe fighting be-
tween the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the mili-
tant Islamist group Fatah al-Islam. The destruction of a 
densely populated area of roughly 200,000 sq m (50 ac) 
displaced approximately 30,000 people.3
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) com-
menced a major reconstruction project in September 
2008. UNRWA and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) entered into an agreement on the 
management of NBC’s rubble-removal and EOD proj-
ects. Following this agreement, UNDP signed a fixed-
price, time-constrained (with penalties for missing 
deadlines) contract with the construction and demoli-
tion company Al-Jihad for Commerce and Contracting 
S.A.L. for the safe removal and treatment of approx-
imately 500,000 cubic m (6,539,800 cubic yd) of rubble and 
waste material in an environmentally sound manner dur-
ing an 18-month period. For EOD, UNRWA and Handicap 
International (HI) entered into a contract, which provisioned 
four EOD teams to search and clear all explosive items on-
site in the above-ground rubble. HI performed the EOD op-
eration according to the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS); HI’s methods and procedures were approved by the 
Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC).
The EOD contract was based on an assessment made by 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group), which revealed heavy UXO 
contamination in the northern area (red portion of Figure 1). 
Furthermore, LAF stated that during the fighting in 2007 
four or five air bombs were dropped and not detonated in the 
NBC red zone. 
The rubble-removal project aimed to integrate and opti-
mize the work processes of the two contractors as quickly as 
possible. Success was determined as safe rubble removal and 
UXO clearance according to UNRWA’s time schedule and 
the NBC reconstruction project. Contractually, NBC’s recon-
struction project was independent of the rubble-removal and 
EOD projects. However, reconstruction was contingent upon 
the time frame of the other projects and could not commence 
until completion of EOD and rubble removal. 
The rubble removal and UXO-clearance project started 
in September 2008. The two tasks were done simultaneously 
and the project was completed on schedule in October 2009. 
The monitoring took place from the start of the project to 
September 2009, approximately one month before the end 
of the project.
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Figure 1. Outline of the planned reconstruction of 20 ha 
(50 ac) divided into eight packages, starting with the recon-
struction of package one, progressing in numerical order and 
ending with the completion of package eight.
Figure courtesy of UNDP and UNRWA.
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss1/9
34 feature | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2014 | 18.1
Figure 2. Sketch of NBC indicating location of UXO found in the Palestinian Refugee Camp of Naher el Bared 
by the end of August 2009.
Figure courtesy of UNDP, UNRWA and Handicap International.
Integrated Rubble Removal and EOD Process
The integrated rubble removal and EOD work involved
•	 Demolishing structures on and removing rubble from 
work sites
•	 Loading rubble onto trucks and transporting it from the 
work site to the laydown area for final inspection and 
additional UXO survey4
•	 Transporting rubble declared free of explosives by HI to 
the final disposal area 
Each of HI’s four EOD teams included a team leader and 
four UXO operators. The EOD and rubble-removal teams 
worked together to remove all rubble layer by layer and clear 
UXO until the terrain’s surface was reached and cleared. The 
following procedures were used:
•	 EOD teams visually surveyed the work area before 
entering.
•	 UXO was removed and/or marked for destruction on site.
•	 The rubble-removal team used machines to gradually 
clear the area to the natural ground level, stopping for 
UXO removal or destruction as needed.
•	 At the natural ground level, the EOD team performed a 
survey of the newly exposed surface. 
•	 Any additional UXO found was removed or de-
stroyed, and remaining rubble at the natural ground 
level was removed.
•	 HI certified the surface UXO clearance and LMAC ap-
proved the clearance in accordance with IMAS.
EOD team leaders moved UXO considered to be safe to 
a central UXO demolition site in an open concrete bunker 
and destroyed it by detonation. UXO considered unsafe to 
move was destroyed on-site. On-site detonation temporar-
ily closed the area, stopping all activities and resulting in 
worker evacuation. 
By the end of the work in September 2009, a total of 11,348 
items were found. Excluding weapons and small-arms am-
munition, approximately 2,500 (22 percent) were hazardous 
explosive items. Figure 2 and Table 1 present UXO details 
and distribution.
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AMMUNITION 
TYPE OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP TOTAL
Riﬂ e
grenades 12 111 184 197 125 89 68 89 90 49 48 32 1,094
Hand 
grenades 3 21 46 42 28 21 13 12 18 12 4 5 225
Projectiles 4 40 42 24 28 13 14 12 5 9 12 9 212
Mortar
shells 6 57 95 80 88 53 26 40 27 35 31 22 560
Rockets 0 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 11
Bombs 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
RPGs 0 2 8 5 3 1 1 0 8 0 2 1 31
Mines 0 4 4 0 2 0 2 5 0 0 5 1 23
Fuzes 0 10 13 47 23 8 14 25 20 23 9 5 197
Small-arms 
ammunition 0 190 404 636 2,122 573 314 295 1,352 1,134 1,180 416 8,616
Miscellaneous 0 8 38 44 77 9 6 1 12 1 58 0 254
Weapons 1 5 6 13 22 6 21 3 6 19 13 6 121
Total 26 451 842 1,090 2,520 777 479 482 1,538 1,282 1,363 498 11,348
Booby traps 1 14 17 9 3 2 3 6 1 5 5 5 71
Table 1. Items of UXO found each month according to Handicap International’s report from October 2008 to September 2009.
Table courtesy of author/CISR.
Cooperation and Conflicting Interests
The contractual setup, including the decision to split the 
rubble-removal contract and the EOD contract into two in-
dependent contracts, proved crucial during the project imple-
mentation. All partners expressed the importance of proper 
coordination between the rubble-removal contractor and the 
EOD contractor to ensure NBC’s successful recovery and re-
construction. However, at the project’s inception, the partners 
did not fully understand the methodology of cooperation and 
team building essential to working in the field.
The EOD contractors’ prioritization of safety in a time-
variable contract and the rubble-removal contractor’s prior-
itization of work speed due to a fixed-price, time-restricted 
contract were in disaccord, causing frustration and conflicts 
of interest throughout the project. The rubble-removal con-
tractor allegedly did not understand the requirement of ar-
moring the machines and providing personal protection 
equipment for demolition workers. Moreover, the EOD con-
tractor often claimed that the rubble-removal contractor’s 
personnel did not respect the safety rules. Additionally, due to 
the safety-distance requirements for rubble removal, allocat-
ing work for all four EOD teams on the site was difficult. As a 
result of positive dialogue, the two partners found a suitable 
modus operandi on a daily basis respecting safety and work 
performance to successfully complete the project.
Security, Health and Safety
The project’s successful implementation depended on 
overall security in north Lebanon. During the implementation 
period, the situation was calm: No serious incidents occurred 
with no negative environmental impact on the work. According 
to the UNRWA-UNDP agreement, UNDP and UNRWA were 
responsible for the safety and security of the UNDP project-
management unit. UNRWA was responsible for the safety of 
all UNDP staff on a daily basis within NBC, while UNRWA 
managed the relationship with NBC authorities, including the 
military and the EOD contractor. UNDP was responsible for 
the planning and management of health and safety on-site. 
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The rubble-removal contractor presented a comprehensive 
health-and-safety plan, which included occupational health 
and work-safety precautions. 
The EOD contractor was responsible for overall EOD and 
rubble-removal safety and managed the risk of uncontrolled 
UXO detonation in accordance with IMAS.
LAF controlled access to NBC and supervised on-site ac-
tivities. The access procedures were somewhat problematic 
at the start of the project; however, thanks to very successful 
cooperation between the project partners and LAF, the daily 
work on-site ran smoothly throughout the project’s duration.
Because of the high risk of uncontrolled UXO detonation, 
the EOD teams and the rubble-removal teams followed spe-
cific requirements in accordance with LMAC’s accreditation 
of the EOD contractor’s work procedures. The most important 
safety rules were as follows:
•	 All personnel on the work site were required to wear 
personal protective equipment, which included a helmet 
with an eye screen and a body vest.
•	 All machines operating on-site needed protection with 
armor and safety glass. 
•	 The required safety distance between the machines and 
teams was 100 m (109 yd).
•	 The required safety distance between unprotected per-
sonnel and machines was 250 m (273 yd).
•	 All personnel working on site were provided information 
and UXO awareness training by the EOD contractor. 
•	 Before entering the site, all personnel were required 
to report to the EOD contractor’s checkpoint and be 
registered.
Figure 4. NBC risk assessment by MAG. UXO-contaminated 
zones: Red area—heavy density (50 to 125 units of UXO per 
hectare) and possible five unexploded 250 kg air bombs; Am-
ber area—normal density (13-49 units of UXO per hectare); 
Green area—light density (6–12 units of UXO per hectare).
Figure courtesy of MAG, Risk Assessment Report, April 2008.
    Success Criteria
 • The rubble removal shall be completed in such a way that the respective areas are cleared
    and ready for construction works in accordance with the reconstruction project’s time plan.
 • Neighbors must be satisﬁ ed, and the number of claims by neighbors must be low.
 
 • No serious accidents should occur.
 
 • The greatest possible amount of rubble will be recycled and reused for the beneﬁ t of the
   NBC reconstruction project, and the smallest possible amount of materials will be disposed
   of at public landﬁ ll sites.
 • The project should deploy a large number of local, NBC people.
 • No negative discussions should be in the media.
 • No additional costs should be incurred.
Figure 3. Success criteria of the NBC rubble-removal project.
Figure courtesy of the author/CISR.
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During the rubble-removal project, 
uncontrolled UXO detonations caused 
seven accidents. One was very serious: 
A detonation hit two rubble-removal 
workers who were sorting waste and 
rubble. One of the workers was severely 
wounded, hospitalized for several days 
and was unable to work for five to six 
months. All critical accidents took place 
within the project’s first four months. 
No accidents were reported after Febru-
ary 2009. 
Besides the accidents, a total of eight 
uncontrolled explosions were reported, 
but they did not cause injury. The inci-
dents involved small explosive items, 
such as hand grenades. These items 
detonated either when machines hit un-
discovered UXO or during loading or 
unloading of rubble (i.e., when UXO in 
the rubble fell to the bottom steel plate 
of a truck).
Four air bombs (two 250-kg and 
two 400-kg bombs) were found and 
handed over to LAF. Considerable ef-
forts were made to find the fifth bomb, 
but documentation of reported unex-
ploded bombs was very poor. It was 
concluded that only four bombs were 
among the rubble. 
Lessons Learned
The NBC rubble-removal project 
demonstrated that clearing war-dam-
aged buildings containing UXO is both 
challenging and risky. Seven accidents 
and eight uncontrolled detonations dur-
ing the clearance of the 200,000 sq m (50 
ac) urban area were reported. 
Splitting the overall rubble-removal 
project into two separate contracts—a 
fixed-price, rubble-removal contract 
and a time-variable, EOD contract—was 
not appropriate. The project setup with 
respect to the cooperation between the 
two contractors was problematic, espe-
cially regarding safety-measure plan-
ning and control, such as maintaining 
safe distances, wearing personal protec-
tion equipment, etc. In the future, it is 
recommended that rubble-removal con-
tracts and EOD contracts be merged, 
either with a shared set of contractual 
conditions or linked together under full 
control of one project manager.
Further, rubble removal and EOD 
are based on different working cul-
tures. Rubble-removal, demolition and 
building-waste management are part of 
the construction sector, while EOD has 
roots in the military sector and is per-
formed under the terms of the emer-
gency or development sector. The two 
work routines and cultures should be 
integrated at all levels. Emphasis should 
be placed on team building and mutual 
understanding between the two contac-
tors in order to avoid conflicts of interest 
regarding speed and safety. 
The history and timing of the NBC 
rubble-removal project demonstrated 
that this type of project requires detailed 
and careful planning together with 
highly professional project management 
and control. 
Recommendations
Removal of destroyed buildings 
contaminated with UXO requires inte-
grated management of rubble-removal 
work and EOD work. Mutual under-
standing of the work and associated 
risks, together with open cooperation 
between the two types of contractors, is 
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a mandatory precondition for an effec-
tive and successful result. 
Establishing the complete project 
organization at the project’s start is re-
quired, and all planning documents, 
including work plans, health-and-safety 
management plans, as well as the quali-
ty-management plan, must be available 
from the beginning. 
See endnotes page 66
Deminers search for UXO amidst concrete rubble and iron bars.
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